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PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
PROCESS, PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR PAGE
Paul B. Herbert*
The powers of the government of the state of Mississippi shall be divided into
three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy,
to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another,
and those which are executive to another.
-Mississippi Constitution Art. 1, § I
To one unlearned in the law it would seem but a bland truism
that a court has authority to make rules for its own operation.
Professor William Page, however, is not unlearned in the law.
In his article, Constitutionalism and Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons
from the Crisis in Mississippi,1 he consequently finds reasons to
lament the recent promulgation by the Mississippi Supreme Court
of a set of Rules of Civil Procedure to govern in the inferior courts
of that state.
Essentially, the court rested its action on two grounds: what
Professor Page aptly terms "institutional competence" (viz., the
proposition that judges presumably know more about court pro-
cedure than do legislators) and "judicial independence" (viz., the
view that separation of powers liberates courts from legislative
intrusion into court procedure, just as it precludes court in-
terference with legislative processes).'
Institutional Competence
Virtually anyone at all familiar with the processes and pro-
duct of state legislatures would, as a factual matter at least, eagerly
concede the court's "institutional competence" premise. Professor
Page attempts a rather forlorn and backhanded defense of the
relative competence of legislators in the realm of court procedure:
"Legislatures do not have daily familiarity with procedure; but
neither do they have any familiarity with occupational health,
energy policy, or the myriad other complex substantive areas in
which they must legislate."' Of course, that the legislature may
be no more in-the-dark about court procedure than about any other
thicket it plunges into does not meet, let alone rebut, the seem-
*Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College; A.B., 1973; J.D., 1976, University of
California, Berkeley.
1. Page, Constitutionalism and Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons from the Crisis in Mississip-
pi, 3 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. at 34.
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ingly self-evident propositon that courts typically have more ex-
pertise in how courts run than do legislatures. To put it different-
ly, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not presume to "legislate"
respecting "occupational health, energy policy, or the myriad other
complex substantive areas" it may understand no better than the
legislature. Rather, it acted only in the one area it surely can be
expected to know better, court procedure."
In any event, Professor Page would choose to dismiss the
"institutional competence" premise as irrelevant. "The major dif-
ficulty," he writes, "with the court's reasoning is that it confuses
expertise with legitimacy."' The "major difficulty," in fact, with
Professor Page's thesis is that it "confuses"federal constitutionalism
with state constitutionalism. He observes: "Rulemaking . . . is
lawmaking. . . . Courts do, of course, make law. But their
legitimacy in doing so depends on their adherence to the judicial
process ... " 6 The reader is thereupon apprised that this "judicial
process," on which a court's precarious "legitimacy" "depends,"
consists in the court's meticulously limiting itself to deciding on-
ly actual cases and controversies. That is, courts exist only to ad-
judicate particular cases but never to promulgate (or "legislate,"
as my colleague would have it)7 procedural codes of general ap-
plication. In straying beyond this restriction, a court direly jeopar-
dizes its mysterious "legitimacy":
Once courts are cut free of the case or controversy element of their law-
making function, as they are when they issue advisory opinions or when they
make rules of procedure, they no longer have this legitimacy. . . . [T]he im-
4. Professor Page writes:
While many supreme court justices have been trial court judges, not all have. Further-
more, their duties on the appellate bench do little to provide them first-hand knowledge
of the current needs of the trial courts. The practicing lawyers on legislative judiciary com-
mittees can have equal or superior awareness of those needs.
Page, supra note 1, at 34.
However, the state constitution mandates: "No person shall be eligible to the office of judge
of the Supreme Court who shall not . . . have been a practicing attorney . . . for five years im-
mediately preceding such appointment." Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 150. See Newell v. State, 308
So.2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975).
5. Page, supra note 1, at 28.
6. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
7. Professor Page identifies the court's action as a product of "legislative jurisdiction." Id.
at 16. This characterization is, of course, argumentative, turning as it does on his notion of
separation-of-powers and "judicial process." The court's own straightforward notion seems at least
equally compelling: "The inherent power of this Court to promulgate procedural rules emanates
from the fundamental constitutional concept of the separation of powers and the vesting of judicial
powers in the courts." Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975). After all, as Professor
Page admits, "the [constitutional] phrase 'judicial power' is not self-defining. . . ." Id. at 17.
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portance of their personal preference on issues of policy becomes critical. In
short, they begin to function as a political body.'
Putting aside the problem of deciphering the meaning and
relevance of the enigmatic implication that, apart from the pre-
sent issue, an elected state supreme court does not "function as
a political body,"9 Professor Page's position begs the question.
As a matter of fact, the case and controversy limitation as an ele-
ment of jurisdiction -including the not-always-honored proscrip-
tion against issuing "advisory opinions"-is instrumental to the
"judicial process" of certain federal courts only by virtue of the
United States Supreme Court's gloss of Article III of the federal
Constitution."0 Professor Tribe has explained:
'Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this . . . limita-
tion placed upon federal courts by this case and controversy doctrine.'
Justiciability doctrine is peculiarly self-regarding. In deciding whether a case
or controversy exists, federal courts decide whether they would be acting ap-
propriately if they resolved the question which the litigants press upon
them. . . . [Its explication], therefore, is in an important sense the description
of an institutional psychology: an account of how the federal courts, or more
accurately the Justices of the Supreme Court, view their own role."
Significantly, even federal courts established under Article I (such
as the United States Tax Court, the local courts of the District
of Columbia, and until 1953, the Court of Claims) 2 and hence
not subject to Article III's "cases" and "controversies" language
(and gloss) unquestionably have authority to render advisory
opinions." The Mississippi Constitution contains no language even
remotely suggesting a "cases" and "controversies" restriction.'
8. Id. at 30. (footnotes deleted).
9. Id.
10. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-7 to 3-29 (1978); C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12 (1976).
11. TRIBE, supra note 10, § 3-7 at 53 (footnotes deleted; emphasis in original). See also
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
NOWAK] ("Interpreting [the 'cases' and 'controversies'] requirement is an important example of
the self-imposed limitation on judicial review.")
12. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 11, at 35-36 (1976). Under the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, the Court of Claims is now merged
with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
13. NOWAK, supra note 11, at 56. State courts, too, are thus free to issue advisory opinions,
and some do. See generally Comment, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has exercised the power to issue such opinions without any constitutional or statutory
authorization. Id. at 81 note 3. The Mississippi Supreme Court does not render advisory opin-
ions. Gipson v. State, 203 Miss. 434, 36 So.2d 154 (1948).
14. In fact, the language of the state constitution makes it quite clear that the framers had
in mind a materially different institution from the United States Supreme Court. Whereas the lat-
ter, for instance, is a court of both original and appellate jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2, the Mississippi Supreme Court is clearly confined to appellate jurisdiction: "The Supreme Court
shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals." MIss. CONST. art. VI,
§ 146; State v. Keeton, 176 Miss. 590, 595, 169 So. 760, 762 (1936).
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A fortiori, the Mississippi state courts are thus not chained to
"how," as Professor Tribe puts it, "the Justices of the [United
States] Supreme Court, view their own role."'"
The Mississippi Supreme Court's conclusion that the judicial
function under that state's constitution embraces procedural
rulemaking therefore hardly seems to warrant the label
"breathtaking": 6 "The phrase 'judicial power' in section 144 of
the Constitution includes the power to make rules of practice and
procedure, not inconsistent with the Constitution, for the efficient
disposition of judicial business."17
Any suggestion that, in fundamental aspects of its nature or
structure, a state government mandatorily is a clone of the na-
tional government is patently unsound. As to state legislative ap-
portionment, for example, the United States Supreme Court not
only has rejected the national legislature as a purported analogy,"'
but has consistently construed its reapportionment norm of "one-
man-one-vote" to mean one thing regarding Congressional elec-
tions and quite another regarding elections for state office.
Equally unsupportable would be the contention that, when
construing its own constitution, a state court is under some general
constraint to defer to the United States Supreme Court's reading
of a similar or even identical provision of the federal Constitu-
tion. Aptly, though in another connection, the California Supreme
Court has declared: "It is established that our Constitution is 'a
document of independent force' 'whose construction is left to this
court, informed but untrammeled by the United States Supreme
Court's reading of parallel federal provisions .... ""
Thus, the argument against the "institutional competence"
premise is essentially that, for no obvious or articulated reason,
the Mississippi Supreme Court, in its posture vis-a-vis the
15. TIUBE, supra note 10, § 3-7, at 53 (emphasis added).
16. Page, supra note 1, at 11.
17. Southern Pacific Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So.2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968), quoted
in Newell v. State, 308 So.2d at 76.
18. We hold that .. . the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats of both houses of
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis....
Much has been written since our decision in Baker v. Carr about the applicability
of the so-called federal analogy to state legislative apportionment ar-
rangements. . . . [W]e . . . find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state
legislative districting schemes.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-573 (1964) (italics in original).
19. See NOWAK, supra note 11, at 662-64.
20. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 525, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 776, 557 P. 2d 65,
67 (1976).
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legislature, voluntarily should be more deferential to the
abnegatory example of the United States Supreme Court. This
is certainly arguable (though not seductive to me) as a purely
aesthetic contention, but it is no more than that. In attempting
to clothe it with spurious reasoning derived from some a priori
notion of appropriate "judicial process," Professor Page has
generated only a tour de force. Courts, he posits, should (to
preserve their "legitimacy") behave a certain way, essentially us-
ing the federal mode as their beacon. The Mississippi Supreme
Court is a court. It does not behave like a federal court. Therefore
it is wrong.
Attempting to buttress his charge of "illegitimacy," Professor
Page observes that the court promulgated the new rules without
adequate contemporaneous explanation and in a manner that (a)
could be construed to indicate perfunctoriness and (b) engendered
confusion regarding which of two drafts of the rules it had final-
ly adopted. Conceding arguendo that the promulgation was not
accomplished with optimal deftness, what bearing can this have
on the court's authority, or "legitimacy"? Applying the same test
to the legislature, for instance, how much of the current state (or
federal) statutory law is "legitimate"?
In addition, Professor Page objects that
the court's competence in rulemaking is undermined by its function as the inter-
preter of rules. Once the court has approved the rules, it has taken a public posi-
tion in favor of their validity; if confronted later in adjudication with a challenge
to their validity, it will be very difficult for the court to be objective and im-
possible for it to appear so."
But would this problem disappear if, as Professor Page proposes,'
the court were to limit itself to recommending rules, subject to
final legislative adoption? And what does this argument say as
to the "legitimacy" of the routine practice of courts, state and
federal, in reconsidering precedents and indeed in granting rehear-
ings after decisions in particular cases?
No less an authority on the judicial process than Justice Car-
dozo emphasized, in a well-known decision,23 that our system con-
templates no congruence among the states or between a state and
the nation as to the nature of that process. The Montana Supreme
Court, in declaring a state railroad commission tariff schedule
unconstitutional, had announced that its decision would be of pure-
ly prospective application- that is, relief would not be granted
21. Page, supra note 1, at 35.
22. Id. at 43.
23. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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even in the instant case. Notwithstanding the United States
Supreme Court's general aversion to pure prospectivity, ' the Court
unanimously affirmed; Justice Cardozo unambiguously
acknowledged a state court's liberty in this regard:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for
itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward .... The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic
philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and
nature. . . . If this [pure prospectivity] is the common law doctrine of adherence
to precedent as understood and enforced by the courts of Montana, we are not
at liberty, for anything contained in the constitution of the United States, to thrust
upon those courts a different conception either of the binding force of precedent
or of the meaning of the judicial process."
Finally, my colleague mauls the straw-man argument that the
federal conception of judicial review, derived from Marbury v.
Madison," supports the court's action. Of course it does not; in
fact, it has no bearing at all. The salient questions are: (1) How
is the Mississippi Supreme Court's position that its new Rules of
Civil Procedure flow out of the Mississippi Constitution's
separation-of-powers provision instrumentally different from, for
example, the United States Supreme Court's position that its
"Miranda" warnings flow out of the federal Constitution's self-
incrimination provision? and (2) even if the two positions are per-
tinently distinguishable, Why must (or should) Mississippi con-
form to the federal mold? These questions Professor Page does
not address. "'
24. Cf Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HAsRv. L. REv. 56, 76 (1965).
25. Great Northern Ry. Co., 287 U.S. at 364-66 (emphasis added). State courts often pro-
nounce prospective applications when abolishing sovereign or charitable tort immunity, as in-
deed the Mississippi Supreme Court recently did. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046
(Miss. 1982). In fact, is not all obiter dictum, with which appellate courts regularly favor the
reader, an "advisory opinion"?
26. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. To put the matter somewhat differently, the "cases" and "controversies" limitation ap-
plies to a court's adjudicative function of rendering decisions and really is incoherent as applied
to a court's administrative or supervisory function of issuing procedural rules not connected to
any particular decision. For instance, many state supreme courts, including Mississippi's (see Miss.
CODE ANN. § 73-3-301 (Supp. 1982)), are charged with the task of issuing rules of professional
conduct, abstract from any concrete case. In Marbury, the Supreme Court began the process still
under way of surveying its own domain, and in U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947), it held axiomatically that "a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." Id.
at 292, note 57 (quoting Carter v. U.S., 135 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1943)). This only is what
the Mississippi Supreme Court has done. See Tollison, A Plea For Adoption of the Proposed
Mississippi Rules of Evidence, 53 Miss. L. J. 49, 64 (1983). The Newell case, ably analyzed
by my colleague as the basis of the court's action, was in fact preceded by a decision in which
the state supreme court unanimously held itself not bound by a statute purporting to govern its
procedure; Chief Justice Gillespie declared: "The inherent power of the Supreme Court to pro-
[Vol. 3:45
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Judicial Independence
Professor Page's assault on the court's "judicial independence"
premise boils down to two aesthetic objections and an ipse dixit.
He argues, first, that judges already have enough
independence-by virtue of their lengthy terms of office and the
prohibitions on reduction of their salaries, and in the judicial power
to void egregiously unfair procedures as violative of due process -
so why should they want more? The answer, of course, is: Why
shouldn't they?
Next, Professor Page urges that "[pirocedural rights may be
important.. .,"' can "deeply affect the relationships of the citizens
and the state,"29 and "implicate powerful economic and political
interests."" Then, after quoting a rather alarming but not palpably
relevant pronunciamento by Napoleon Bonaparte, he concludes
ominously that "[b]oth [Napoleon's] logic and the court's would
virtually eliminate the legislature's power over the structure and
operation of government."3 Perhaps so (though one fervently
hopes not), but the court's position that it was acting in the best
interest of, in my colleague's words, "the citizens and the state,"
and acting indeed to protect those interests from the throes of
legislative intransigence, remains unrefuted.
Ultimately, Professor Page endeavors to turn the court's
separation of powers rationale on its head by arguing, in essence,
that procedure and substance are inextricably entwined and that
the court, in adopting procedural rules, has actually usurped the
legislative prerogative over substance. In other words, far from
being justified on account of the separation of powers, the court's
action actually violates the separation, by invading the legislative
domain. To the contrary, procedure and substance would appear
to be fairly readily segregable. Clearly, for instance, the specifica-
tion of the period within which a complaint must be answered
in order to avoid default in no way diminishes or burdens the
substantive rights reflected in the pleadings.3 By contrast, a rule
mulgate procedural rules for the efficient disposition of its case load stems from the fundamental
constitutional precepts of separation of powers and vesting of judicial powers in the Courts. Miss.
CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 1, art. VI, § 144 (1890)." Matthews v. State, 288 So. 2d 714, 715 (Miss.
1974).
28. Page, supra note 1, at 39.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Nor, I would submit, does a prospective alteration of a limitations period diminish or
burden the underlying right involved. After all, one can always waive assertion of one's substan-
tive right, either by bringing suit late (whatever the limitations period) or by not bringing suit
at all. Professor Page differs with me on this. Id. at 42.
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imposing a ceiling on the allowable recovery manifestly alters the
substantive right in question and could not, consequently, be suc-
cessfully disguised as "procedural." During the tempestuous re-
cent controversy surrounding the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Professor Moore instructively wrote:
Rules of evidence are clearly within the Supreme Court's rulemaking power.
They are procedural, for they govern the presentation of facts to court or jury,
enabling the trier to apply relevant principles of substantive law on the basis
of the facts adduced. That many rules of evidence are important and have a
substantial effect in reaching an adjudication does not take them outside rulemak-
ing.... Until recent congressional action, judicial rulemaking had been generally
regarded as the right way to deal with the subject matter of evidence. It is still
the right way. Congress should recognize as much and refrain from further in-
tervention in the rulemaking process."
Professor Page contends that the court's eschewal of the class
action device "will affect substantive rights. . .";" that "even the
most purely procedural rule can affect the substantive policy of
the right being enforced"; 5 that "[t]oo many procedural rules go
beyond mere housekeeping and implicate important questions of
policy";36 that "even the most clearly procedural rule can affect
public policy"; 7 and that "[m]any rules that are purely procedural
for Erie or conflict-of-laws purposes nonetheless affect the scope
of substantive rights ... "38 True enough. Procedure can cer-
tainly "affect" substantive law (as can myriad other factors such
as the acumen of one's counsel, the composition of the jury, and
the vicissitudes of the economy). This is not to say, however, that
procedure constitutes substantive law. The difference, if not always
crystal clear, is real, workable and salient.
History
Apparently not content that "the court made no attempt" 9 to
justify its action by reference to history, Professor Page constructs
a hapless straw-man historical argument on behalf of the court -
33. Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 11-12 (1974)
(footnote deleted). I do not mean to equate evidence and procedure; in fact, it would seem that
the substance-versus-procedure distinction is eo ipso clearer in the case of procedural rules than
in that of evidential rules, and that, as an abstract proposition, the latter would be expected to
have the greater impact on substantive rights. The state legislature has, incidentally, been similarly
derelict in its inattention to Mississippi's motley common law "system" of evidence. "Rules of
evidence are sorely needed, for as the Court pointed out in Michelson v. United States, it cannot
create a sound corpus of evidence on a case by case basis." Id. at 11 (footnote deleted). See Tollison,
supra note 27, at 49-51.
34. Page, supra note 1, at 41 (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 17.
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based on the genesis of the Mississippi Constitution in 1890 and
the development of civil procedure in other states-which he then
boldly dispatches."°
The message of history on this issue, as on many constitu-
tional questions, is muffled if not outright equivocal;" and the
relevance of nineteenth century history, in particular, seems to
me tenuous. What is arguably relevant is more recent history:
The Mississippi legislature had for many decades derelictly
failed to act, thereby engendering serious injustice and mounting
inefficiency in the court system. This legislative inaction
necessitated and hence justified judicial action." Indeed, the
"legitimacy" of Mississippi's inferior courts- that is, their capacity
to command the respect and good will of the populace-was, if
anything, enhanced by the state supreme court's ushering them
into modern times. 3
To the extent, however, that more remote history is relevant,
it is worth noting that Mississippi, among all the states, has the
40. Ensnared by his own rhetorical device, my colleague, having conceded that the court
in no sense explicitly resorted to historic justification, nonetheless later observes that "[fthe court
did not rest its action solely on an historic argument. . . ." Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Comment, 26 HASTINGS. L.J. 1059, 1062-63 (1975).
42. Manifest necessity, owing to legislative inaction, clearly can serve to justify otherwise
debatable judicial action. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-212 (1962):
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations
are political questions .... Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem in-
variably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of
the history of its management by the political branches [inter alia] .... For example, though
a court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been terminated, since on that question
'governmental action .. .must be regarded as of controlling importance,' if there has been
no conclusive 'governmental action' then a court can construe a treaty and may find it pro-
vides the answer.
Indeed such necessity was explicitly invoked as a basis for judicial initiative in Newell v. State,
308 So. 2d 71, 78 (Miss. 1975), the court's chief precedent: "[W]hen, as here, the decades have
evidenced a constitutional impingement [owing to legislative inattention to the need for procedural
reform], impairing justice, it remains our duty to correct it."
43. On such an afternoon the various solicitors in the cause . ought to be-as are
they not? -ranged in a line ...between the registar's table and the silk gowns, with bills,
cross-bills, answers, rejoinders, injunctions, affidavits, issues, references to masters, masters'
reports, mountains of costly nonsense piled before them. Well may the court be dim ...;
well may the fog hang heavy in it, as if it would never get out; ...well may the uninitiated
from the streets, who peep in through the glass panes in the door, be deterred from en-
trance. . . .This is the Court of Chancery . . ., which so exhausts finances, patience,
courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that there is not an honorable
man among its practitioners who would not give-who does not often give-the warning,
'Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come here.'
C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 18-19 (Signet Classic ed.).
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oldest heritage of an entirely elective judiciary, dating from 1832."
By contrast, federal Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the
President subject to confirmation (or rejection) by the
Senate" -and all other federal judgeships do not even exist but
as Congress deigns to create and maintain them. 6 As such, is it
unreasonable that the role of the judiciary might be slightly larger,
and its authority somewhat different, in Mississippi than in the
federal court system?47
It is also, I imagine, of some significance that, notwithstand-
ing its copious detail concerning the structure, powers, and obliga-
tions of the legislature (eighty-one sections, in all), Article IV
of the Mississippi Constitution ("Legislative Department") makes
absolutely no reference to the promulgation of rules of civil
procedure. ' Further, the state constitution explicitly grants plenary
appellate jurisdiction to the state supreme court," unlike the federal
Constitution, which pointedly subjects the United States Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to statutory modification or
curtailment."0 It has accordingly been noted:
44. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1973). Professor Page sees much
significance in the fact that, at the adoption of the current state constitution in 1890, the Mississippi
Supreme Court was no longer elective. It is true that, owing to the vagaries of Reconstruction
politics, Mississippi was obliged to accept an appointed three-judge court for a few decades com-
mencing in 1868. Id. at 323. This happenstance is less impressive to me than the facts that Mississippi
created an entirely elective judiciary in 1832, reverted to it in 1910, and has clung to it without
interruption from then to now. In Mississippi today, supreme court justices must stand for reelec-
tion, by district, every eight years. MISS. CONST., art. VI, §§ 145, 149. Circuit and chancery
court judges must stand every four years. Id., art. VI, § 153. Mississippi's judiciary is, by this
measure, very "democratic," not only in contrast to the appointed-for-life federal judiciary, but
in contrast to the judiciaries of many states, in some of which judges are also appointed (e.g.,
MASS. CONST. § 65 and N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6) and in others of which elective terms are quite
lengthy: for instance, on the California Supreme Court, twelve years (CAL. CONST. art. VI, §
3); and on the New York Court of Appeals, fourteen years (N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
46. Id., art. III, § 1.
47. Oddly, the relevance in this regard of the fact that Mississippi legislators are elected
is apparent to Professor Page but the concomitant relevance of the fact that Mississippi judges
too are elected (unlike their federal brethren) eludes him:
[I]f the legislature has considered the reform and rejected it, then the court finds itself
standing against the explicit wishes of the citizens' elected representatives .. . .There
is a distinctly undemocratic flavor to an argument that the court should give the people
what they need, not what they want.
Page, supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis added). Apart from the rhetorical indulgence embodied in
the unsupported dichotomy that the legislature gives the people what they want whereas the court
does not, why is any action by an elected body (albeit a court) intrinsically "undemocratic," or
any more so than the same action taken by another elected body (such as a legislature)?
48. Seemingly, no stone was left inadvertently unturned: "The legislature shall not authorize
payment to any person of the salary of a deceased officer beyond the date of his death." Miss.
CONST. art. IV, § 92. Nor were the framers oblivious to the subject of procedure: "Statutes of
limitation in civil causes shall not run against the state or any subdivision or municipal corpora-
tion thereof." Id. art. IV, § 104.
49. Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 146.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869).
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Yet, while the Supreme Court has always considered the rulemaking pro-
cess to be judicial in nature, it has nevertheless consistently recognized the
preeminence of the legislative branch in this area....
This legislative primacy results from Congress's power to make 'Exceptions
and ... Regulations' to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction....
If the Constitution were merely silent regarding the power to promulgate
rules of judicial procedure [as the Mississippi Constitution is], it could hardly
be doubted that the Supreme Court possessed the rule-making power granted
by the Constitution. However, the Constitution has given Congress the prerogative
of making exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion. It is apparent . . . that the [federal] constitutional power to make rules of
court procedure is neither exclusively legislative nor entirely judicial."
In addition, in Mississippi the constitution mandates the crea-
tion of the state's general-jurisdiction inferior courts, 2 whereas
the federal Constitution, as previously noted, significantly leaves
the very creation and continued existence of all federal courts other
than the Supreme Court to the unfettered discretion of Congress."
This is vital, for, as Alexander Hamilton pointed out: "A power
to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial. .. ."
Since in Mississippi the constitution creates the courts, the source
of authority to issue rules to govern those courts is that same con-
stitution; under the principle of Marbury v. Madison, it is the state
supreme court that is the ultimate expounder of that document s"
and thus of which governmental branch ought to issue the
necessary procedural rules. In other words, the authority of the
Mississippi court system derives directly from the state constitu-
tion, hence, it has inherent rulemaking jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the authority of the federal judiciary is, immediately at least,
legislatively derived, hence, its rulemaking jurisdiction is con-
comitantly circumscribed.
As to the development of procedural rules in other states, the
lesson is ambiguous. As Professor Page concedes, the high courts
of eleven other states during the present century have claimed
51. Comment, 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 1059, 1064-67 (1975).
52. "The legislature shall divide the state into not more than twenty (20) circuit court districts
and not more than twenty (20) chancery court districts .... Should the legislature fail to redistrict
the circuit or chancery court districts [at specified intervals, to reflect census data], the Supreme
Court shall, by order, redistrict such circuit or chancery court districts." Miss. CONST. art. VI,
§ 159 (1890, amended 1982) (emphasis added). It is true that Mississippi's limited-jurisdiction
county courts are of legislative origin in the sense that their existence is not mandated by the
state consitution. See Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 172. This, however, in no way erases the central
fact that, in terms of constitutional foundation, the Mississippi judiciary (and particularly the state
Supreme Court) is distinct from its federal counterpart.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 83.
55. See Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 77 (1975).
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essentially the same authority he views as usurptive on the part
of the Mississippi Supreme Court."' In any event, why should
Mississippi be constrained to follow the lead of even all forty-
nine other states, let alone a mere majority? The peculiar genius
of our system is that the American state is comprised of fifty
distinct polities, through whose individual experiments (successes
and failures) the nation collectively advances. As Justice Brandeis
pointed out: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."" Though Justice Brandeis
was concerned on that occasion particularly about "social and
economic experiments," is his rationale any less supportive of
"political experiments"?"
Conclusion
Professor Page has performed a valuable service. By criticiz-
ing the Mississippi Supreme Court's rule-making initiative
thoughtfully, thoroughly, and eloquently-yet, in my judgment,
failing to make the case-he has vindicated that initiative.
At issue, fundamentally, is not the principle itself of
separation-of-powers, but rather whether our federal system con-
templates potential diversity among the several states as to the
precise content of that principle. The Mississippi Supreme Court
has justified its promulgation of procedural rules on its quite
tenable conception of government organization in Mississippi.
Judicial integrity, it has concluded, requires that the courts govern
themselves internally and not be perpetual captives of the
legislature, which has long shackled them to superannuated and
justice-impeding procedures by egregious dereliction respecting
a task that, in any event, would clearly appear to be more in the
domain of judicial than legislative competence.
56. Page, supra note 1, at 26 n. 157.
57. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. Id. The Court consistently has given the Brandeis observation expansive application, recent-
ly invoking it, for instance, in a criminal procedure decision, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560,
579 (1981). As such, of what concern to Mississippi is the posture assumed by other states, like
antebellum Maryland, see Page, supra note 1, at 20, and on what basis does Professor Page challenge
the court to "answer" other states? Id. at 11. (My collegue would perhaps prefer that this nation
were a "united state" rather than the United States.)
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Professor Page's argument consists of basically three com-
ponents: (1) history; (2) the largely self-defined role of federal
courts in the structure of national government; and (3) the claim
that substantive law and civil procedure are indistinct. I have at-
tempted briefly to outline why I believe that the first component
is unhelpful, the second, irrelevant, and the third, erroneous.
"A court is a court," Professor Page contends, in essence.
Our constitutional system, however, argues back, "There are
courts, and then there are courts."

